A Share in a Farming Enterprise Is No Longer a “Safe Haven”

The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court’s decision of January 21, 2026 (case No. 904/1615/22) effectively closed one of the most convenient “grey zones” in enforcement proceedings — the ability to shield assets within a farming enterprise structure.

For years, debtors relied on a simple argument: a share in a farming enterprise is not the same as a share in a typical corporate entity, and therefore enforcement against it is either impossible or at least questionable.

That argument no longer holds.

The Grand Chamber explicitly confirmed that both a debtor’s share in the pooled capital of a farming enterprise and the corporate rights arising from that share are valid objects of enforcement. Consequently, the seizure (arrest) of such rights is not a debatable issue but a lawful tool to ensure the execution of court decisions.

The case itself originated from an attempt to challenge a private enforcement officer’s decision to seize a debtor’s share in a farming enterprise. All court instances upheld the enforcement officer’s actions, and the Grand Chamber went further — it not only confirmed the legality of the seizure but also established a coherent framework for enforcing claims against such assets.

At the core of the ruling lies a reassessment of the legal nature of farming enterprises.

The Court clearly stated that a farming enterprise is a corporate-type legal entity. Participation in such an entity gives rise to corporate rights, which include both proprietary and non-proprietary elements. These rights are inseparably linked to the participant’s share in the enterprise.

This point is crucial: by establishing this connection, the Court rejected the idea that the “special nature” of farming enterprises creates immunity from enforcement. If a share exists, it has economic value — and if it has value, it can be subject to enforcement.

At the same time, the Court acknowledged an obvious gap: Ukrainian law does not provide a specific mechanism for enforcement against a share in a farming enterprise. However, the absence of explicit regulation cannot serve as a basis for avoiding enforcement.

This is where the Grand Chamber took a decisive step — it applied the principle of analogy of law.

Importantly, the Court rejected the application of rules governing limited liability companies, finding them unsuitable due to the specific nature of farming enterprises, which are typically based on family or kinship ties. Instead, the Court identified general partnerships as the closest legal model.

Accordingly, it applied the approach set out in Article 131 of the Civil Code of Ukraine: if the debtor lacks sufficient personal assets, the creditor may demand the allocation of a portion of the enterprise’s property proportional to the debtor’s share.

This significantly reshapes enforcement practice. The issue is no longer about selling a share, but about gaining actual access to the enterprise’s assets through allocation mechanisms.

Another key aspect of the ruling concerns the seizure of corporate rights.

The Grand Chamber emphasized that such seizure restricts the debtor’s ability to dispose of their assets and prevents their withdrawal. In this context, seizure serves not as a punitive measure but as a mechanism to ensure the real execution of a court decision.

The Court also addressed the evidentiary role of the Unified State Register.

It reaffirmed the presumption of reliability of registry data. If the register indicates the size of a share, an enforcement officer is entitled to rely on that information. The risk of incomplete or inaccurate data lies with the party responsible for its submission.

In practical terms, this means that attempts to “hide” the true structure of ownership outside the register will no longer be effective in disputes with third parties, including enforcement proceedings.

Ultimately, the Grand Chamber’s decision in case No. 904/1615/22 is not merely a resolution of a single dispute.

It is a clear signal: the absence of direct regulation is no longer a tool for avoiding the enforcement of court decisions. Farming enterprises can no longer serve as protective structures for shielding debtor assets.

This is one of those rare cases where the Court does more than interpret the law — it closes a systemic loophole that had long worked in favor of bad-faith debtors.